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R. M. SAUNDERS, OF NORTH CAROLINA,

AGAINST

RECEIVING, REFERRING, OR REPORTING ON  
ABOLITION PETITIONS.

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 19 & 23, 1844.

WASHINGTON :

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1844.



## SPEECH.

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On the motion of **Mr. BLACK**, of Georgia, to amend the motion of **Mr. DROMGOOLE**, of Virginia, to recommit the Report of the Select Committee on the Rules, by instructing them to report to the House the following Rule, viz :

“No petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territory, or the slave-trade between the States or Territories of the United States in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever.”

**MR. SAUNDERS** rose and spoke to the following effect—

It is my purpose, Mr. Speaker, to vindicate the 21st rule, and to answer such of the recent prominent objections as have been urged against it. Whilst I have manifested some anxiety to obtain the floor at an earlier day, I had not desired, at the outset, any discussion on the subject whatever. Hence my votes to lay on the table, and for the previous question. Not that I felt unwilling to meet the opponents of the rule in debate, but that I supposed discussion on the subject would do no good here, and might produce mischief elsewhere. In saying this, I beg to be understood as not complaining of my colleague, [Mr. CLINGMAN,] who addressed the House some days since; because from his situation, his unfortunate situation, as I consider it, (separated from the delegation of his own State, and the entire delegation of the South,) explanation on his part was both proper and becoming. But he will pardon me for saying, however well satisfied he may be with his own course, and however much he may feel flattered by the manner in which his remarks may have been received in certain parts of the House and of the country, I doubt if they will prove equally satisfactory to the section of country from whence we come.

But, sir, I am admonished, by the limits of my hour, to proceed at once to the points which have been made in the debate. It is said, in the first

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place, as I understand the objections, that the rule violates the right of petition; that it is wrong in itself, having been productive of no good, but much mischief; and that it should be revoked, in obedience to the public sentiment at the North, in order to save those friends and allies who have stood so manfully by us in support of the rule. These, I believe, cover the whole ground of objection, and these I hope to meet and answer in a satisfactory way.

First: It is said the rule violates the sacred and constitutional right of petition. It has been distinctly asked, and I repeat the question, What is it gentlemen mean by the right of petition? We desire some precise and definite answer—not the vague and general answer which has been given, that it means the same thing in regard to abolition petitions that it does in regard to all other petitions. This, with due submission, is no answer at all. We desire to know where the right begins and where it ends. If it be, as is contended, a constitutional right, which the House is bound to respect, then most certainly it is susceptible of some precise definition. If gentlemen mean merely to say that the people have the right peaceably to assemble, and to petition Congress for a redress of grievances, then it was not necessary to travel back to Magna Charta to establish what none will question. And I go further, and admit not merely the right of the people thus to assemble and petition for a redress of grievances, whether real or imaginary, but they have a right to expect from their Representatives an answer to their petitions. But if I am to understand these advocates of the right of petition, as denying to Congress the right of deciding as to the manner and mode of giving this answer, as well as the time when, then I am prepared to contest the existence of any such right. The Constitution declares: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Now, sir, I doubt not the cause suggested by my friend from South Carolina, [Mr. RHETT,] the Riot and Sedition Acts, as they existed in the mother country, was the true cause of inserting this prohibitory article in the Amendments to the Constitution. But whatever may have been its origin, we find it in the Constitution, and as intended to guard the personal privileges of the citizen; and as such it commands our respect. You shall make no law (and the rules of this House, as I admit, are laws, so far as this matter is concerned) abridging the freedom of speech. Yet, at the last Congress, you adopted the one hour rule, and have again adopted it, thus limiting every member in his right of speech to one hour. Again, you have a rule authorizing a call for the previous question, which, when sus-

tained by a majority, closes all debate, and even cuts off debate at the outset, if then put and carried.

These rules most clearly abridge the freedom of speech ; yet they rest on the power of the House—a power which belongs to all Parliamentary bodies, of regulating its own proceedings. Your one hour rule presupposes the indulgence of unlimited debate as retarding the business of the House ; and your previous question is founded on the belief that any debate is injurious to the public interest. Hence, whilst many have, and still question the propriety of these rules, none can deny your power to enact them, as a means of regulating abuses.

Again : Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press ; and though I be no advocate for sedition laws, and would sooner see it run into licentiousness than have it curtailed in its privileges, yet I suppose none can doubt the power of Congress to make it an indictable offence for any press here to libel a member by a false charge of bribery. But to the matter in debate.

It is asserted that the rule violates the right of petition. How ? Because it excludes the petition from being received, heard, and acted on. By the Parliamentary law, no petition is receivable unless on leave ; and as modified by the rules of the House, any member may object, and raise the question of reception—determinable by a majority. This is the principle on which the rule for excluding abolition petitions rests. A majority desire to save the time of the House, by avoiding this question of reception on every petition which is debatable, and because they believe Congress possesses no power to legislate on such matters ; or if they have the power to legislate, they ought not to do so ; and hence the rule for excluding such subjects altogether. It is the solemn judgment of a majority, adopted after argument and deliberation. It is the very question we are now considering, whether this rule shall stand as the judgment of the House.

But it is said, you do not give the petition a hearing ; and, says my colleague, [Mr. CLINGMAN,] you cannot know that the petition asks for that which is unconstitutional, without a hearing. And herein, Mr. Speaker, consists the fallacy of the argument, because it is not true in point of fact. Your rule declares “that no petition or other paper, praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territory, or the slave-trade between the States, shall be received by the House.” Now, sir, unless the prayer of the petition asks for one of these four things, the rule has no effect. The rule does not attack, nor is the Speaker authorized to put it in force until he learns from the member, or by reading it himself, that its prayer embraces one of these objects. The member is heard, and, through him, the petitioner speaks, in a “brief statement” of the

contents of the petition ; not by giving the argument, but the facts, and what it is the petition asks to be done. It is on this statement that the Speaker pronounces the decision of the House, as declared by the majority in the adoption of the rules, that they will not legislate on the subject of abolishing slavery in the States, the District, the Territories, or the slave trade between the States ; and therefore it is they will not receive any petition touching these matters.

I admit, whenever a majority are prepared for legislation on any one of these subjects, the rule should be so modified or rescinded. But unless the majority are thus prepared for action, the rule should stand ; as I think I have succeeded in showing it neither abridges any right of the people peaceably to assemble, nor does it exclude them from a hearing. They certainly do not claim to be heard at our bar, or to have their petitions read and printed, unless it be the pleasure of the House to grant it, as a matter of respect, or with the view to its own information. This is a favor which the House extends at its own discretion. These abolition petitioners are heard as all other petitioners, and are answered by the rule. The journals of the House show the names of those who vote for the rule, and thus declare to the petitioners who are in favor and who are against their petitions.

I repeat, then, according to our rules of proceeding, the petition is heard and considered, and the result is made known by the presiding officer of the House, when he is called on to execute the rule. The answer is, then, as distinctly given as if a vote was had on each and every petition. I ask, then, why receive, debate, and consider each petition separately, when the judgment of the House has been formed and taken against them collectively ? Such is not the course of proceeding in our courts, where the rights of person and of property are involved. *Res judicata* is a rule of jurisprudence, not only from its fitness and propriety, but because without it an end could never be had to litigation. I do not mean to say the present Congress should refuse to grant what has been refused by its predecessors ; but I do say, common respect for ourselves requires that we should adhere to and maintain our own judgments.

But it is demanded that we should treat these abolition petitions with the same respect we do all others ; and that we dare not thus treat the petition of the revolutionary soldier. I will not stop to inquire whether the abolitionist be entitled to the same respect as the soldier of the Revolution, whose work he seeks to destroy. But how stands the case of the soldier ? Your law has declared your soldier shall only be entitled to a pension on showing six months' service, or more, and his widow, on proof of marriage prior to the year 1794. Now, would you receive and consider the petition of the

soldier, if he only claimed a service of three months? or that of his widow, if married subsequent to the period fixed by law? If you did, it would be from mere courtesy, or with the view of changing the law—considerations which do not operate in favor of abolition petitions. In the case of the soldier, the law answers the petition; in the case of the abolitionist, the rule of the House gives the answer. In either case, the reception and consideration of the petition would be a useless consumption of time.

This brings me to the question, whether the rule be in itself right and proper? I understood the gentleman from New-York [Mr. BEARDSLEY] to admit, if the petition asked Congress to interfere with the institutions of slavery within the States, it was what we could not constitutionally do, and therefore such petitions should not be received; but if it asked the abolition of slavery within the District of Columbia, it then became a question of expediency, and such petitions should be received. Now, sir, this is the very question I desire to meet and to answer. It is admitted it is not constitutionally competent for Congress to interfere with slavery as it exists in the States; so I deny that Congress possesses any rightful power to abolish slavery within the District. The Constitution contains no grant or power to appropriate the public money to any such purposes. The gentleman from New-York admits the master's right of property in the services of his slave. It is an admission any one not a maniac, or infected with the mania of abolitionism, is forced to make. This right of property existed both in Virginia and Maryland at the time of their deeds of cession to the United States of this District. As early as 1715, Maryland, then a colony, declared all persons of color within its jurisdiction, or who might be brought there, and their descendants, should be slaves for life. Such was the statute law in Maryland; and the same principle prevailed in Virginia. The act of cession by Virginia contains the following *proviso*: "That nothing herein contained shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein." And although it has been contended that this condition only applied to the rights of individuals in the soil, it will be found from the scope of the whole act, that this is too narrow a construction; and that it is intended to guard and protect personal rights generally. But however that may be, I do not rest my argument on that ground. I say this protection of individuals in their property is secured by a much higher power: it is to be found in the Constitution itself. The fifth article of the Amendments declares, "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." This direct recognition of private property, and that it can only be taken for "public use," excludes the idea of its being taken for any other purpose. I had supposed the gentleman from New York [Mr. B.] and myself belonged to the same political school, so far at least as the constitutional powers of Congress were involved; that we both drew our test and rules of construction from the same high source; that, whilst discarding the modern doctrine of the general welfare, which substituted the will of the majority for the Constitution, we adhered to the good old Republican principles of 1798, as established by Madison and Jefferson, and as carried out by honest George Clinton, when, as Vice President, he gave the casting vote for the rejection of a renewal of the charter of the United States Bank. But I fear, with the gentleman, as with others who claim to be within the Republican fold, what was then deemed sound in principle is now to be taken as South-

ern abstractions. Will the gentleman turn to the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, and tell me if he finds there any power to appropriate the public money to the purchase of slaves? Yet in that section is to be found an enumeration of your constitutional powers. In that section I read that Congress shall have power, *inter alia*, "to lay and collect taxes; to pay debts; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to establish post-offices and post-roads; to declare war." Does the gentleman concur with that political class who derive the power to carry on a general system of internal improvements from the power to regulate commerce? or does he derive it from the power to establish post-offices and post-roads? or will he seek it in the war power? No, says the gentleman; he subscribes to no such political heresies. But within this District you possess unlimited jurisdiction; here your powers are as omnipotent as that of Parliament itself; because here you have the right "to exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever." I shall not question the right of Congress to legislation within this District, to the exclusion of all other legislative bodies; but still it does not follow that your powers even here are without limit or restriction. If so, what becomes of the prohibition against an order of nobility, or of an established religion, and the free exercise thereof? Can you have an order of nobility and an established church within the limits of these ten miles square? And why not? Because of the injunctions of the Constitution. And is not the injunction that private property shall not be taken but for *public use*, and that on compensation, just as obligatory in the one case as in the other? The same article of the Constitution gives to Congress the power to erect forts, magazines, and arsenals, and grants it the "like authority" as within the District. And am I to be told the land ceded by North Carolina for an arsenal may be made the receptacle for slaves; and that Congress possesses the power of declaring that every slave who may enter its limits shall be free? If so, cannot you go farther, and say they shall be armed and received into your military ranks; and thus give us here, what are to be found elsewhere, regiments of blacks? Can gentlemen be surprised that every Southern man should feel startled at such a claim of power? And to this end must it lead, if not met and resisted at the threshold. I know the gentleman from New York said, whilst he claimed the right of emancipation, he waived the question of compensation. Now, with due submission, he must allow me to say this was dodging the question. Your right to emancipate depends upon your power to compensate. I say you have no constitutional competency to appropriate the public money to any such object; and, therefore, you cannot emancipate. I do not question your right to pass laws authorizing their owners themselves to manumit, either by will or deed. What I deny is, your power to raise by taxes, levied on the thirteen slaveholding States, the means of purchasing from their owners, within this District, their slaves, with or without their consent. I will not say, whenever you exercise this power of emancipation within this District the Union is dissolved; I use no such threat. But this I will say, when you shall be so reckless of consequences as to do such an act, it will be no longer a debatable question, but that every man who is not faithless to his own household will stand to his arms.

And now, Mr. Speaker, allow me to notice the personal allusion of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Hudson.] That gentleman has thought

fit to ask me (for what purpose, I know not) if I did not myself, years ago, introduce an abolition petition. The same matter has been repeatedly brought before the people of my own State, where, I believe, it has been explained to the satisfaction of such as have heard me. I was in Congress for the first time in the years 1821-22, when I received a petition from a Society of Friends, highly respectable persons, asking for the abolition of slavery and for the suppression of the African slave-trade. The President (Mr. Monroe) had called the attention of Congress specially to the latter subject; and a Select Committee (at the head of which was a gentleman from South Carolina) was created on that part of the message. The petition was presented by me, received, and referred to that committee. Thus far the subject was a legitimate one, and there was nothing wrong in the matter. This might be a sufficient answer to the question. But I desire not to take refuge under such a technical cover. At the time I offered that petition, all was quiet; the fell spirit of abolitionism had not then sought to disturb the harmony of our proceedings in this Hall, nor to poison the public feeling in regard to this distracting question. What was innocent then would be criminal now. What I then did, without reflection, I would not now do after reflection. The question of jurisdiction in regard to slavery had not then been made, at least not to my knowledge. I trust this answer will satisfy the gentleman; and that, instead of seeking to find a precedent to justify his own conduct, he and his friends will follow my example, and promise in this particular to sin no more.

I return to the next point in the argument, (the 21st rule.) Was it, as has been asserted, wrong in itself, effecting mischief, rather than good? By what process of reasoning are gentlemen brought to this conclusion? It is said a majority may grant leave to any member to introduce a bill abolishing slavery within the District, and pass it in defiance of the rule. Grant it; and what does that prove? That the rule is either useless or mischievous? Most certainly not. On the contrary, it establishes that the right, which is so zealously insisted on, is in itself useless. If the majority have the right of action, as I admit they have, then why trouble ourselves with receiving, hearing, and referring these petitions? It is because the majority say they are not disposed to act, that I insist on the utility of the rule. My colleague says he is opposed to abolishing slavery, and a majority concur in that opinion. Then, I ask, for what end receive and consider these petitions? Does he desire to bring this out-door sentiment to operate in the House, so as to change our present majority into a minority? I hope not. I have no disposition to disturb the relation between the constituent and his representative. I admit confidence, mutual and endearing, which should subsist between the representative and constituent, to constitute the brightest gem in the diadem of a representative Government. I desire not to tarnish its lustre; but still I cannot consent to see the bad feeling out of the House brought to operate here, in order to change what all should admit to be right. Gentlemen deceive themselves when they say discussion on this subject can do no mischief. It is one of the very ends resorted to, in order to render the slave discontented with his condition. And I doubt not the triumph which the gentleman from Massachusetts [MR. ADAMS,] says he has gained within these walls, has already been sounded elsewhere. I beg not to be misunderstood. Whilst the South does not fear the slave, and believes them contented if not excited into mischief, none are so hardy as not to dread the awful con-

sequences of insurrection. It has not been the fortune of my colleague, nor of other members on this floor, as it has been mine, after these threatened insurrections, to stand by the anxious mother as she watched over the sweet slumbers of her innocent babe, when the smallest whisper, like the fire-bell at midnight, beats alarm to a thousand fears. I say, then, to gentlemen, unless they are prepared to act, to pause—and to silence forever these mad disturbers of our peace and repose.

I come now, Mr. Speaker, to the last point which has been made in this discussion, and that is, the call upon the South to surrender this rule, in order to propitiate the public sentiment of the North, and to save those friends who have stood so manfully by us on this question. So far as my colleague is concerned, his appeal has but little effect. He has acknowledged his opposition to the rule—that he thinks it wrong, and ought to be given up; and his political friends at the North have voted against it. Yes, sir; if the gentleman will take the trouble to examine, he will find but a single Whig vote in favor of the rule north of Mason and Dixon's line, and the head of that individual has, within a few days, fallen a victim to the guillotine in the other end of the Capitol. So to the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. ADAMS,] who seeks to propitiate high Heaven as a reward for his exertions, and claims the applauding *vox Dei*, to cheer him on in his heedless course, I turn with a deaf ear. The gentleman from New York, [Mr. BEARDSLEY,] comes in a still more questionable shape. He claims not the approbation of Heaven, but the plaudits of *vox populi*; and from the signs of the times, and the billing and cooing in certain quarters, it is not difficult to divine whose favour he seeks to gain. Let me, then, say to gentlemen, in all candor, if the Democracy of the South are to be thrown off for these abolition allies, all we desire is, to know it, that we may take our discharge without asking. The call coming from such quarters as these, I regard not. But those who have hitherto acted with us in good faith, and whose sincerity we cannot now question, for one, I am prepared to treat with the utmost kindness and respect. To such I beg to say, they greatly deceive themselves if they can possibly suppose any modification, or even the repeal of this rule, will silence this out-door clamor about the right of petition. No, sir. And I beg to invite for a moment the attention of my Northern friends to the legislative history in regard to this matter. These abolition petitions had been received, and referred generally to the Committee on the District of Columbia, where they remained without action. This course was not satisfactory to the petitioners, and they became so clamorous, that, in 1836, they were referred to a Select Committee, of which Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, was chairman. That Committee reported three resolutions: 1st, That Congress possessed no constitutional power to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States; 2d, That they ought not to abolish slavery within the District; and, 3d, That all abolition petitions should be laid upon the table without debate. These resolutions were adopted by large majorities. Still the abolitionists were not satisfied, and these petitions continued to multiply and disturb the proceedings of this House. Next came the Atherton resolutions, in the year 1838, which declared, in substance, that it was not competent for Congress to interfere with the question of slavery in the States; that any interference with the matter within the District of Columbia, with intent to abolish slavery within the States, was against the spirit of the Constitution, and in violation of the public faith; and that all petitions touching the ques-

tion of slavery should be laid upon the table without debate. These resolutions were adopted at a period of great excitement; and as they admitted the reception of the petitions, it was hoped the matter might end. Not so; when the House was driven into the adoption of the 21st rule, which forbids their reception. With these recorded facts before their eyes, I ask gentlemen, in all candor, how it is possible for them to suppose the mere reception of these petitions will silence their clamors about the right of petition? They might as soon expect to extinguish the conflagration, by adding fuel to the flames. I repeat, then, there is but one alternative—rejection without action, or reception and action. There is no middle ground that can satisfy those who are resolved to press this matter, whatever its consequences. You would not listen to the petition of him who calls upon you to fire the splendid edifice in which we now sit. Why, then, encourage these new incendiaries, who seek to destroy the very temple of liberty, and involve in its ruins all that we hold dear on earth. [Here the morning hour expired, and Mr. S. was forced to take his seat.]

Mr. Speaker, allow me to devote the short time I have left of my hour, in a reference to some other matters in support of what I said on a former day, that nothing short of action will satisfy these abolition petitioners. I beg, in the first place, to refer the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. ADAMS,] and those who think with him that Congress is bound to receive these petitions, to the report of the Committee on Rules, consisting of a majority of his political friends, and the chairman his own colleague, made at the first session of the last Congress. He will there find that the committee recommend a modification of the rule, so far as to provide, that the question of reception shall be considered as made on the presentation of any abolition petition, and that question shall be laid on the table without debate; thus yielding the question of reception, and avoiding that of jurisdiction, against which the South contends. I again call the attention of my Northern friends to what is transpiring on this floor, to satisfy them that nothing but mischief can follow the repeal of this rule. You will have a discussion of the whole matter on the question of reception of each petition. How much better, then, even so far as time is concerned, that the question should be met at once, by excluding such petitions altogether. You have seen the character of the petitions introduced on yesterday by the gentlemen from Ohio [Mr. GIDDINGS] and New York [Mr. BEARDSLEY.] The Constitution directs that all fugitive slaves "shall be delivered up," whenever they may escape from one State into another, on the claim of their master. And Congress, by the act passed as early as 1793, has provided the legal mode of asserting this claim, and of recovering the fugitive. The Supreme Court, by a recent decision, has said this power of legislation belongs to Congress, independent of the States; and yet these petitioners call on Congress to revoke this injunction of the Constitution, and to protect the runaway slaves from their masters. Such an application, one would have supposed, could have found no countenance here. I desire further to call the attention of gentlemen to another proceeding in this House—to the resolution coming from the Legislature of Massachusetts, which has been received and referred to a select committee; which resolution, the gentleman [Mr. ADAMS] informed us, came from a Democratic majority of that Legislature. I beg to refer the gentleman to a different paternity for the origin of his resolution, as well as to a different source for its revival. The House had not forgot-

ten the petition of George Latimer, backed by fifty-odd thousand persons from the gentleman's own State. Let me tell gentlemen, and my own colleague, who this George Latimer was: a runaway slave from the State of Virginia—a slave who had been pronounced as the property of his owner by one of the Judges of your own Supreme Court; and still that law-abiding people was unwilling that this man should recover his property, and had forced him to dispose of it at a mere nominal price. And yet my colleague is willing to throw open the door of this House to receive the petition of runaway negroes. And are we to sit here, receive, hear, and consider petitions coming from slaves, painting in all the horrors of their imagination their former condition, and slandering and abusing the people of the South? This may accord with what the gentleman may consider as due to the South; but it does not accord with my notions, or that of the people I represent. Let me, Mr. Speaker, trace this petition a little farther. Not having received a favorable hearing here, we next hear of it in the Legislature of Massachusetts. It there met a more favorable reception, being referred to a select committee, the chairman of which was the son of the gentleman, [Mr. ADAMS;] and in his report we find the same arguments we have often heard from the lips of his father. Such had been the revival. Now, sir, for the origin of this proposition. The House had not forgotten some of the memorable occurrences of the late war—that this same State of Massachusetts had then called a Convention, which afterwards sat at Hartford, in Connecticut. Yes, sir; during the darkest period of that war, the persons there assembled, (as appears from Niles's Register, which I hold in my hand,) had agreed on this very proposition to amend the Constitution, by uprooting and destroying the very basis upon which the Constitution rests, by depriving the Southern portion of the Union of that representation on which is founded the only surety for their slave property. Yes; our labor is to be taxed, in order that its proceeds may be appropriated to our own destruction. Gentlemen deceive themselves if they suppose a free people can or will submit to such an act of self-destruction. But, Mr. Speaker, you have not forgotten the reception of those who came here to submit such a proposition as this to a Republican Congress. The country had then been delivered from war; the bosom of every lover of his country beat with gratitude for this deliverance; the war had just closed in a blaze of glory; the star-spangled banner floated on the mountain wave; and the American eagle flapped his wings in triumph on the plains of New Orleans. It was at a period like this that the emissaries arrived. Did they come within these walls and ask this House to receive their message? No, sir. They skulked away in darkness, fit objects for the slow unmoving finger of scorn to be pointed at. And this was the proposition, conceived in disaffection and brought forth in treason, which had, at this day, been received and honored with a select committee.

In conclusion, as I have but a minute or two remaining, let me once more appeal to my Northern friends. I ask the gentleman from Maine, if there be any here who have hitherto stood by us, why should they now give way? I turn to our friends from Connecticut, and ask them, why should they yield? If I appeal in vain, I turn to those by whom I know the appeal will be answered—to patriotic New Hampshire; whose sons, like her granite basis, had hitherto breasted the storm—they, I know, will not give way. So I call upon our friends from the Keystone State, not to surrender because a single soldier

in the South has deserted us on this trying occasion. To the few, but Spartan band from the great State of New York, though threatened with the public sentiment of this new-born Democracy, I would say, be firm, and the day was not distant when they, too, would be honored, like those who had stood by the Constitution and the country in the dark days of the Missouri question. But if these invocations were all in vain, then would I turn with pleasure and delight to the gallant and patriotic West. Here Mr. S. was forced to conclude from the expiration of his hour.

